Information Abundance and Knowledge Commons by Madison, Michael J
 
 
 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series 
Working Paper No. 2016-35 
November 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information Abundance and Knowledge Commons 
 
 
 
 
Michael J. Madison 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First published as a chapter in : 
User Generated Law: Re-Constructing Intellectual Property Law in a Knowledge Society, 
edited by Thomas Riis (Edward Elgar, 2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Pittsburgh School of Law 
3900 Forbes Avenue 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260-6900 
 
www.law.pitt.edu 
412.648.7855 
E-mail: madison@pitt.edu  
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the  
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2867578 
Information abundance and knowledge commons 
Michael J. Madison 
(forthcoming in Thomas Riis ed., User Generated Law: Re-constructing Intellectual Property 
Law in a Knowledge Society (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes a fundamental conceptual and empirical challenge to the foundations of 
intellectual property (IP) law and then describes what to do in response.  
The standard accounts of IP law describe systems of legal exclusion intended to prompt 
the production and distribution of intellectual resources, or information and knowledge,1 by 
making those things artificially scarce. The argument here and below frames IP law instead as one 
of several possible institutional responses to the need to coordinate the use of intellectual resources 
given their natural abundance, and not necessarily useful or effective responses at that. The chapter 
therefore aims to shift the analytic framework from law to governance, and from IP law in isolation 
to IP law as part of commons, or resource management. Examples and illustrations are drawn from 
several domains of information and knowledge governance. 
A more elaborate introduction to the argument can be laid out as follows. The several forms 
of IP law – patent, copyright, design rights, and so on – are specialized institutional responses to a 
subset of the many social dilemmas concerning knowledge and information resources. The 
standard economists’ account of that subset, common to each of these legal fields, is a variant of 
the well-known “tragedy of the commons.” Some relevant intangible or immaterial “thing” in 
some social environment (the “commons,” in this account), such as a creative work or a novel 
invention, will be overused or overconsumed by those with access to that environment, in the 
absence of legal devices that limit access to it and permit the thing’s producer to exclude unwanted 
users, or charge a fee for use, or both. Non-paying users are characterized pejoratively as “free 
riders.” This dilemma of overconsumption prompts the related dilemma of underproduction. 
Because information and knowledge resources are naturally abundant – they are, in their intangible 
forms, public goods – it is said that only exclusion of free riders permits producers to recover their 
costs of production and a reasonable profit. In the absence of cost recovery, these resources will 
not be produced in sufficient quantity or quality. IP law solves these dual dilemmas, by creating 
legal protections for creative works, inventions, designs, and the like. Access and consumption of 
these resources is restricted, in the discretion of the producer (that is, the IP rights owner). In sum, 
naturally abundant intellectual resources must be made artificially scarce to ensure their continued 
production and distribution.2 
                                                          
1 The chapter uses the phrases “intellectual resources,” “information and knowledge,” and “information and 
knowledge resources” interchangeably. Each phrase is intended to include propositional knowledge, 
technical and scientific knowledge, art and culture, data, and informal, tacit, and customary knowledge. 
2 For present purposes I mostly set aside the important alternative solution to the underproduction dilemma. 
In the text, IP law is a creature and feature of an exchange-based market. As an alternative, the state may, 
and often does, provide information resources either directly (via procurement and production of those 
resources itself) or indirectly (via funding resources, via tax subsidies, and otherwise). 
As applied to knowledge and information resources, this standard account is subject to 
well-known and critical flaws. Most important, because knowledge and information resources are 
public goods – that is, because they are nonrival and nondepletable – the tragic dilemma of 
overconsumption is non-existent.3 Knowledge resources are by definition abundant; consumption 
or use of the resource by one person does not diminish the pool of that resource that is available to 
anyone else. A scarce resource can be overconsumed. An abundant one cannot be. IP rights create 
scarcity in the face of abundance, but in doing so IP systems may produce the very 
overconsumption problem that IP rights are, in theory, intended to solve. Moreover, in certain 
respects existing IP law makes this artificial overconsumption problem worse rather than better, 
by imposing legal standards for protection of copyright works and inventions that are so low, often, 
that cultural and technical worlds are overrun by an overabundance of IP rights.4 Law gives society 
an abundance of artificially scarce resources. 
Social dilemmas concerning the production and distribution of information and knowledge 
resources are important and should not be ignored, and in appropriate settings IP laws turn out to 
be useful and well-justified responses. But inverting usual suppositions about scarcity and 
abundance means likewise inverting usual suppositions about the importance of IP law, rights of 
exclusion, and other conceptual frameworks for managing intangible resources. Social dilemmas 
concerning production and distribution of intellectual resources may be less significant, often, 
when compared with social dilemmas concerning coordination and combination of those 
resources. The experience of user innovation communities5 and the lessons of recent scholarship 
on norm-based creative communities6 teach that intellectual resources may be provided and 
distributed via robust systems that have little or no basis in formal IP law. Yet coordination and 
combination of those resources may be extraordinarily challenging, as they often overlap and/or 
interact with one another as they are consumed and re-used. Few intellectual resources today exist 
in splendid isolation from other intellectual resources; re-mixing within and across scales, genres, 
traditions, and histories is the historical norm rather than the 21st century or digital exception.7 
As necessary solutions to relevant social dilemmas, IP systems may be the exception rather 
than the rule. Governance systems, in which the production, distribution, conservation, and 
coordination of abundant resources are managed via blends of law, technical rule, custom, 
convention, and social norm, are likely the more productive framework for understanding and 
interpreting those solutions. 
That conceptual or theoretical beginning is subject to an all-important proviso. The points 
outlined above raise empirical questions as well as theoretical provocations. The remainder of this 
                                                          
3 For an extended version of this critique, see Brett M. Frischmann, Infrastructure: The Social Value of 
Shared Resources (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
4 For a related view, see Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research’ (1998) 28 Science 698. 
5 E.g., Eric von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation (MIT Press, 2005). 
6 E.g., Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman, The Knockoff Economy: How Imitation Sparks 
Innovation (Oxford University Press, 2012); Aaron Perzanowski, ‘Tattoos and IP Norms’ (2013) 98 Minn. 
L. Rev. 511. 
7 This is consistent with Lawrence Lessig’s work, even though he frames his argument in terms of Internet 
exceptionalism. See Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy 
(Penguin Press, 2008). 
chapter is devoted primarily to the empirical aspects of this topic. Perhaps we have IP laws where 
they are unneeded; perhaps we have IP laws where they are needed but that function in ways other 
than intended or desired. A way systematically to investigate those questions from an empirical 
perspective, with due attention to context and nuance, is needed. This chapter outlines such a 
method. 
The chapter takes as its central organizing principle the idea of knowledge commons. The 
phrase “knowledge commons” captures the idea of governance of intellectual resources, including 
copyright works and patented inventions and also including public domain material, data, tacit 
knowledge, and know-how. The term “commons” denotes the proposition that in any particular 
context or environment, those resources are likely to be governed by some combination of positive 
law and informal devices.8 The result may be a regime of more or less strict exclusion; the result 
is often, instead, a regime of knowledge and information sharing, where the sharing has an 
identifiable social and cultural structure or discipline. Call this “managed openness.” Commons, 
according to this usage, does not mean “open to all, on unregulated terms,” even where the 
knowledge resource is formally part of a public domain. Commons means structured sharing. Even 
public domain resources are governed via structures that can be investigated and described. 
The point of linking information abundance with knowledge commons is that knowledge 
commons represents a method of understanding governance of abundant information resources. 
Sharing strategies, as forms of knowledge commons, may exist as responses to social dilemmas 
other than the coordination and combination dilemmas highlighted above. This chapter, however, 
draws attention to those coordination and combination dilemmas precisely because they so clearly 
illustrate the weaknesses of the standard economic justifications for IP laws.9 The chapter does not 
take a strong normative position regarding commons in general. Instead, it offers knowledge 
commons as an analytic framework for collecting research and data regarding governance in the 
knowledge and information context. IP laws may play a role in knowledge commons governance. 
The question to be addressed – rather than simply assumed – is how and when that is the case. 
 Two limitations guide the presentation in order to sharpen it. First, some examples of 
commons as solutions to coordination and combination dilemmas are drawn in parallel with 
scholarship on user-innovation communities. That work describes how end-users of knowledge 
goods – meaning tangible or material embodiments of knowledge resources – explore and exploit 
access to those goods, via use and experimentation, and develop new or improved or different 
applications and forms, all without guidance, commands, or incentives from IP laws or IP rights 
holders. Such user-innovation communities are particularly robust in in technical domains and in 
consumer product or consumer technology domains. Second, some examples are drawn with 
reference to law itself, as an intangible and therefore widely shared intellectual resource;10 user-
                                                          
8 See generally Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison and Katherine J. Strandburg (eds), Governing 
Knowledge Commons (Oxford University Press, 2014), discussed in the following sections. 
9 Julie Cohen frames this point specifically in terms of copyright law.  See Julie E. Cohen, ’Copyright as 
Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda’ (2011) 2011 Wisc.  L. Rev. 141, 155 
(“[C]opyright is valuable not (only) because it is individual and atomistic … but also because it facilitates 
combination and coordination.”). 
10 For provocative accounts of law as a shared information resource subject to coordination dilemmas, see 
Gillian K. Hadfield, ‘Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy’ (2012) 8 I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy 
innovators may develop new models of governance to accompany their modes of innovation.11 
Combining the three perspectives – knowledge commons, user-innovation, and law as a shared 
intellectual resource – one may ask the following question. Can knowledge commons help us 
understand the dilemmas of abundance, meaning both governance by law (as in the case of IP 
systems) and also governance of law? This chapter explores answers. 
 The next section of this chapter introduces the knowledge commons concept in some 
additional detail and provides some initial illustrations. 
 
2.  KNOWLEDGE COMMONS GOVERNANCE 
 
Following Elinor Ostrom’s groundbreaking work on institutions for resource management in the 
natural resource and environmental contexts,12 Frischmann, Madison, and Strandburg describe 
knowledge commons generally as governance solutions for shared resources subject to social 
dilemmas.13 In the first place a resource is identified or created; use of that resource is purposefully 
shared by some population of producers and/or consumers. In the second place there exists a 
number of possible social dilemmas associated with the shared production and/or use of that 
resource, deriving generally from interests in social collaboration and cooperation. Commons 
address one or more of those dilemmas. Commons are forms of governance, or management, of 
shared resources.  
 
With respect to natural resources, Ostrom and her colleagues and collaborators 
demonstrated the viability of a range of sustainable, durable commons governance strategies 
preserving the resource over time, implemented by local groups and communities using well-
structured convention and custom. Commons are collectively managed, and they are often marked 
by the absence of formal, market-based property law systems. In their re-purposing of Ostrom’s 
work, Frischmann, Madison, and Strandburg set out a research framework to investigate the 
viability of equivalent commons governance strategies with respect to knowledge, scientific, and 
cultural resources. Knowledge commons governance may differ from natural resource commons 
governance in key respects, beginning with the fact that knowledge commons resources, unlike 
forests or fisheries, are naturally nonrival or nondepletable and therefore naturally or inherently 
shareable. The case for sustainable commons governance is neither inherently stronger nor weaker 
as a result. Instead, cases of knowledge commons must be researched from the beginning, rather 
than analyzed solely by analogy to natural resource commons. 
 
Drawing attention to information or knowledge abundance rather than scarcity offers only 
an introduction to the reframing that this chapter proposes. Nuances matter. First, the challenges 
                                                          
for the Information Society 1; Gillian K. Hadfield and Barry R. Weingast, ‘What is Law? A Coordination 
Account of the Characteristics of Legal Order’ (2012) 4 J. Legal Analysis 471. 
11 See Katherine J. Strandburg, ‘Legal But Unacceptable: Pallin v. Singer and Physician Patenting Norms’, 
in Rochelle C. Dreyfuss and Jane C. Ginsburg (eds), Intellectual Property at the Edge: The Contested 
Contours of IP (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
12 Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton University Press, 2005); Elinor Ostrom, 
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge University Press, 
1990). 
13 See Frischmann et al., note 8 above. 
of abundance have been noted before, in terms of economic theory,14 in terms of cultural theory,15 
and in terms of social theory.16 Earlier work suggests that abundance in any specific context may 
mean “lots,” or it may mean “too much”; the distinction may have powerful consequences as that 
context is fully described in terms of the social dilemmas that are present. Second, abundance in 
any specific context may be relative rather than absolute. A resource may be abundant with respect 
to its use by an individual or a single agent or with respect to its use relative to a pair of individuals 
or agents (one person or a pair may be overwhelmed by information), and in this sense an 
intellectual resource is an individual resource. Alternatively, a resource may be abundant with 
respect to its use by a group, community, or population (software developers may be overwhelmed 
by information), and in this sense an intellectual resource is a social resource. Again, the social 
dilemmas are described differently in the two cases, and different stable institutional solutions may 
be present. Third, the fact that intangible intellectual resources are abundant, because of their 
nondepletable character, should not obscure the fact that knowledge and information often take 
specific tangible or material forms, which may be independently depletable and therefore scarce. 
Their scarcity should be understood as a distinct but related phenomenon, complicating the 
description of relevant social dilemmas and their solutions.17 
Drawing attention to social dilemmas concerning intellectual resources as coordination and 
combination problems, and suggesting that the knowledge commons concept may unify research 
into durable and effective institutional solutions, complements rather than substitutes for long-
standing research in game theory and related disciplines on theories of coordination via convention 
and custom. The best known work in this genre is Schelling’s theory of focal points as convention-
based solutions to what is sometimes referred to as “the meeting place problem.”18 Focal point 
theory, and related work on conventions, customs, and social norms, shares with the knowledge 
commons concept an acceptance of the possibility of multiple stable institutional solutions to a 
given social dilemma; an acceptance of multiple inputs into those solutions (state-based rules, 
hierarchies, markets and private ordering, and custom, convention, and social norm); and a special 
interest in shared or common knowledge as prerequisite for their emergence.19 The knowledge 
commons concept is not limited to game theoretic environments, however. 
                                                          
14 See Mark A. Lemley, ‘IP in a World Without Scarcity’ (2015) 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 460  (focusing on 
production and distribution issues in IP law but referring only indirectly to governance of coordination 
dilemmas). 
15 See Grant McCracken, Plenitude 2.0 – Culture By Commotion (rev. ed., Periph.: Fluide, 1998); Grant 
McCracken, ‘The Politics of Plenitude’ (1998) Reason (August/September), available at 
http://reason.com/archives/1998/08/01/the-politics-of-plenitude (accessed January 20, 2016). 
16 See Andrew Abbott, ‘The Problem of Excess’ (2014) 32 Sociological Theory 1 (focusing on problems of 
coordination). 
17 See Michael J. Madison, ‘Of Coase and Comics, or, the Comedy of Copyright’ (2009) 95 Va. L. Rev, In 
Brief 27. 
18 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1960). 
19 On the respective roles of common knowledge and salience in the emergence of conventions and social 
norms, see David K. Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (Harvard University Press, 1969); Edna 
Ullman-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms (Clarendon Press, 1977). The idea of law as a solution to 
coordination problems has been imported into legal scholarship by a number of scholars. See, e.g., Steven 
J. Burton, ‘Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract’ (1993) 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 
115; Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, ‘Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or 
3.  AN ILLUSTRATION: LAW ITSELF AS KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 
 Against that background, law itself consists of a potential case of knowledge commons, in 
the sense that law in a general sense or law in any particular social context consists of a shareable 
knowledge resource that is potentially subject to social dilemmas. Law illustrates particularly 
clearly how the prototypical social dilemma for shared knowledge resources may be the problem 
of coordination and combination.20 If multiple individuals or small groups could invent and apply 
their “own” law at will, with no discipline to enforce what is valid, legitimate, and enforceable, 
then – arguably – society could not function. Society runs the risk of excessive conflict as partisans 
of different rule-sets interact but in legally incompatible ways. Despite the many criticisms of 
systems of law-making and law enforcement, it is rare to hear the criticism made that the dominant 
social dilemma regarding law (or good law, or just law, or efficient law) is that it is systematically 
overconsumed and underproduced.21 The problem is typically not too little law, but too much. 
 
Positive law-making by executive and legislative authorities can be understood as a case 
of solving this social dilemma via centralized, top-down, hierarchical authority. Law is a kind of 
shareable resource provided by a single producer, with its development, extension, and 
enforcement coordinated – via disciplinary subdivisions (contract or obligation, property, tort, 
criminal law, and so on) and via institutional subdivisions (courts, legislatures, and agencies at 
national and local levels) – partly by the state and partly (in democratic systems) by private actors.  
 
Does knowledge commons as governance offer a stable alternative to what I have just 
described as government coordination of law?22 The idea of “law” here has to take on a different 
meaning; clearly it is at least unorthodox and at worst incoherent to speak of formal, positive law 
as being collectively managed via convention and custom in local communities. Re-characterizing 
law as a form of governance, or the shared expectations, customs, conventions, and norms by 
which members of a community are governed and/or govern themselves, makes the question more 
tractable.23 New and stable law in that sense can emerge from and be governed from below 
(governance of governance, as it were), that is, from user or community practice, or as practice 
                                                          
"The Economics of Boilerplate")’ (1997) 83 Virginia L. Rev. 713; Richard H. McAdams, ‘A Focal Point 
Theory of Expressive Law’ (2000) 86 Virginia L. Rev. 1649. 
20 See Hadfield, note 10 above. 
21 The criticism is made, but it is rare. Even if underproduction of law is a relevant social dilemma, it does 
not necessarily follow that private rights of exclusion are the appropriate solution. Permitting producers of 
law to appropriate private returns by granting them rights of exclusion in legal resources often – though not 
always – conflicts with basic notions of social justice and equality before the law. See Wheaton v. Peters, 
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834) (rejecting a claim of copyright in the opinions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States); 17 U.S.C § 105 (2012) (excluding works of the US Government from copyright). Crown 
copyright in the United Kingdom suggests that this principle has limits, even in democratic countries. 
22 The question has analogues in political theory. See Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social 
Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (Yale University Press, 2006); James C. Scott, Seeing Like 
a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (Yale University Press, 1998); 
Fred Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the Rise 
of Digital Utopianism (University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
23 It might be more appropriate to treat formal, positive, bureaucratized law and evolutionary, evolving, 
community-managed governance as two poles of a spectrum, although it is plausible to view them as 
occupying a hierarchical relationship as well as an oppositional or complementary one. 
combined with formal rules, rather than exclusively from above, from law-making institutions or 
hierarchies of individuals and firms organized in markets. Commons strategies may emerge to 
coordinate governance of different sorts, among different communities and/or among different 
intellectual resources. 
 
Two brief examples illustrate specific knowledge commons solutions to social dilemmas 
concerning problems of coordination and combination of different sorts, each involving the 
governance not only of conventional intellectual resources (creative works, patentable inventions) 
but also governance of forms of governance.24 
 
Intellectual property pools. A patent pool is an agreement by two or more patent holders 
to aggregate and share their patents by cross-licensing.25 The patents in question typically relate to 
complementary technologies, where one holder’s exercise of patent rights “blocks” a different 
holder’s exercise of related rights. Pooled patents are typically available to all members of the pool 
and are available to nonmembers on standard licensing terms. A well-known example of an early 
patent pool in the United States is the Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association (MAA), which formed 
in 1917 and encompassed nearly all American aircraft manufacturers. The Wright Company and 
Curtiss Company held major patents on aircraft technology, but Wright and Curtiss did not hold 
all the relevant patents, and for any given manufacturer the cost of licensing a single needed patent 
from a competitor might have made manufacturing an airplane prohibitively expensive. During 
World War I, the United States government needed airplanes at reasonable costs and in a short 
time. As a result, the government facilitated the implementation of the MAA, a private corporation. 
The MAA entered into an agreement with airplane manufacturers, through which the 
manufacturers pooled their patents and their potential claims for exploitation of the patents by 
rivals and agreed to cross-licensing of the patents to one another on what was, essentially, a 
royalty-free basis.26 Largely because of this functioning commons of patented inventions, airplanes 
were built, and the war was won.  
 
 The MAA was not the first patent pool; that distinction likely belongs to the Sewing Machine 
Combination, constructed in 1856 among the manufacturers of sewing machines and owners of 
related patents. And it is possible to tell the story of the MAA, and the Sewing Machine 
Combination, and other patent pools, as stories of successful private ordering grounded in 
exchanges of the IP rights documented by patents.27 But telling the story in that way overlooks 
two key features that align patent pools generally with the knowledge commons concept. First, the 
                                                          
24 These examples are drawn from Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann and Katherine J. Strandburg, 
‘Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment’ (2010) 95 Cornell L. Rev. 657. 
25 See Carl Shapiro, ‘Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting’, 
in Adam B. Jaffe et al. (eds), Innovation Policy and the Economy, Vol. 1 (MIT Press, 2001). 
26 See Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 481 (1933); Harry T. Dykman, ‘Patent Licensing 
Within the Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association (MAA)’ (1964) 46 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 646; Robert P. Merges, 
‘Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations’ (1996) 
84 Cal. L. Rev. 1293. 
27 See Adam Mossoff, ‘The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: the Sewing Machine War 
of the 1850s’ (2011) 53 Arizona L. Rev. 165. Carol Rose has argued persuasively that property law and 
property rights are constructed as stories: e.g., Carol M. Rose, ‘Game Stories’ (2010) 22 Yale Journal of 
Law and the Humanities 369. 
very purpose of a patent pool is knowledge sharing, or structured openness regarding the patented 
inventions, rather than exclusion, as a solution to problems of an abundance of patents. Second, 
the knowledge commons solution depends on user (or patentee) creation of a foundational legal 
infrastructure, the cross-license that implements the commitment to sharing in a way that bridges, 
or coordinates, three sets of laws and rules: the default, positive patent regime and the numerous 
patents that are subject to the rules of the pool; the norms and rules of antitrust and competition 
law, governing lawful behavior by market competitors;28 and the set of terms, expectations, and 
practices that governed the pool. 
 
 Open source software. The Linux operating system, an alternative to Windows and Mac OS 
(the Macintosh operating system), was produced and is still maintained by a volunteer 
collaborative of individual programmers. The Linux collaborative is linked loosely by 
communications technologies, by members’ voluntary allegiance to the project, and by the terms 
of an open source license. Unlike proprietary computer programs, which are distributed to users 
in object code or executable format only, open source programs such as Linux are made available 
in source code form so that members of the community may modify their copies and, under the 
terms of the governing license, publish their modifications for use by others. Members of the 
community may also volunteer their modifications for inclusion in the standard Linux code base. 
Each member of the Linux community may use material in the Linux commons and may contribute 
material back to the Linux commons. Each individual member of the community contributes code 
to the accumulated archive of the Linux kernel, which is the core of the operating system. The 
rules governing the use of open source material and contributions to the open source commons are 
partly formal and partly informal. Formally, the software is governed by copyright law, and its use 
is managed by the terms of the General Public License. Informally, the integrity of Linux as an 
identifiable and stable program depends on a thin hierarchy of informal authority, which extends 
from Linus Torvalds at the top to the body of individual developers at the bottom.29 The result is 
a complete, complex, and successful industrial product that is built and maintained not by a 
traditional, hierarchical, industrial firm, but by a loose-knit community. 
 
As with a patent pool, the integrity and durability of the Linux project is due not only to its 
members’ shared commitment to building and maintaining the program and to their contributions 
of time, talent, and code, but also to innovations in the legal form that governs access to the code, 
use of the code, modification and extension of the code, coordination of different portions of the 
code with each other, and distribution of the code, all in great detail. The open source software 
license is itself a widely shared form of user-innovation in law, borrowing much of the terminology 
and structure of a proprietary software license and its relationship to positive copyright law but 
turning that license inside out, to ensure that the program is shared rather than kept secure from 
                                                          
28 Early cases on patent pools and antitrust law shifted from uncritically accepting patent pools as matters 
of freedom to exploit patent rights: see E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902); to 
subjecting patent pools to antitrust scrutiny: see Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 226 
U.S. 20 (1912). 
29 A pair of recent books thoroughly examines the organizational structure of open source software projects. 
See Charles M. Schweik and Robert C. English, Internet Success: A Study of Open-Source Software 
Commons (MIT Press, 2012); Christopher M. Kelty, Two Bits: The Cultural Significance of Free Software 
(Duke University Press, 2008).  
misappropriation.30 In this case social dilemmas arise not only with respect to the need to 
coordinate the technical contributions of many different contributions of code but also the need to 
coordinate the copyrights associated with each of those contributions. As with the patents 
contributed to a patent pool, in an open source project there may be dozens or even hundreds of 
distinct contributions and associated sets of IP rights. In isolation, each contributor possesses a 
separate copyright and therefore has the presumptive right to block unauthorized reproductions 
and adaptations of the work governed by that copyright. The open source license serves as a shared 
legal infrastructure that integrates those abundant legal rights, based on formal copyright law, into 
a single vehicle that is aligned with the substantive norms and expectations of the community. 
 
In short, commons governance in both contexts emerges from user practice but borrows 
explicitly and directly from formal, positive law. Open source software development communities 
are organized around and are coordinated by open source software licenses which, the members 
of both these communities and their commercial partners generally assume, are enforceable with 
respect to contract law, copyright law, or both.31 The software development community usually 
has a social existence that is distinct from the form and terms of its governing license. The 
community governs itself according to a set of informal but shared norms. Those norms are 
codified in part and extended in part in the formal license document. The license therefore has a 
legal existence that is distinct from the full social context of the software development community. 
But these two phenomena – the social world of the open source software developer and the legal 
world of the open source software license – are both necessary to the governance of an open source 
software project. A particular open source software project is a case of commons, a shared resource 
subject to coordination and combination dilemmas and governed by collectively-produced “law” 
with material and immaterial dimensions, and social and legal dimensions: the group, the code, 
and the license. 
 
The next part generalizes, elaborating the knowledge commons concept for potential 
application to empirical investigation of particular cases. The central point introduced below is 
that understanding knowledge commons requires empirical as well as theoretical investigation, 
and effective empirical inquiry requires a systematic approach. The next section describes 
knowledge commons as a research framework, therefore, rather than as a model, theory, or 
prescription. 
 
4.  A RESEARCH FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE 
COMMONS GOVERNANCE 
The point of any research framework is to permit research and data collection to proceed under a 
common set of assumptions and questions, even if specific research methods and disciplinary 
                                                          
30 Any conventional IP license can be understood as a kind of user-innovation with respect to adapting the 
default rules of IP law to the specific needs of the parties to the license. Open source software licenses are 
distinctive in the sense of the scale of their application and utility, because they serve effectively as 
governance not merely for the code and its developers and users but for the open source community as that 
group identifies itself. See Michael J. Madison, ‘Reconstructing the Software License’ (2003) 35 Loy. U. 
Chi. L.J. 275. 
31 Enforceability is generally assumed, although there is relatively little law on point. The leading US case 
is Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
foundations may vary from researcher to researcher or field to field. The framework is neither 
theory nor model.; Strong theorizing and modelling may follow the research but only light and 
tentative theorizing, if any, should precede it.  
The framework as described is borrowed from a recent book by Frischmann, Madison, and 
Strandburg titled Governing Knowledge Commons.32 That book presents the framework and 
applies it to a set of case studies of institutions defined in part by knowledge sharing practices with 
respect to one or more knowledge resources. While the framework is designed for application at 
the institutional level, which are referred to as commons, the intuitions and preliminary 
investigation that animated its development are applicable more broadly. Knowledge resources 
come in many forms. Information and knowledge are principally immaterial, intangible resources, 
but they may be embodied in material forms, in flows of knowledge as well as in forms, and in 
labor and skill and time as well as in embodied creation.33 The balance of this section gives a fuller 
account of the framework; the next section introduces some novel commons problems to illustrate 
the breadth of its potential application. 
The knowledge commons framework builds on a series of related intuitions. Commons 
governance means knowledge and information management characterized by domains of managed 
openness and sharing of relevant resources, and the first intuition is that commons governance is 
in broad use in day-to-day practice in a variety of domains and across a variety of scales. 
Documenting evidence to justify that intuition is a primary goal of the framework. The second 
intuition is that such structured openness in the management of both natural and cultural resources 
is likely to lead to socially beneficial and/or socially productive outcomes. Salient among the class 
of cases where commons governance is successful and sustainable are contexts where social 
interest in positive spillovers from bilateral market transactions is high. Commons may sustain the 
production of spillovers when the market otherwise may not.34 Testing that intuition by applying 
the framework to case studies is the second goal of the framework. Note that describing the 
commons framework in terms of spillovers from bilateral market transactions runs a substantial 
risk of characterizing an information context in “scarce resource” terms rather than in “abundant 
resource” terms; care must be taken in applying the framework to understand the nature of the 
resources in question. The final intuition is that a standard framework for identifying and assessing 
commons across a variety of domains can support the development of more sophisticated tools for 
realizing the potential for commons solutions in new institutional settings and for distinguishing 
commons solutions from other solutions in settings where some other approach, such as an 
approach grounded in IP law, might be preferred. Applying the knowledge commons research 
framework is an exercise in analyzing colloquial commons institutions, such as “scientific 
research” taken in the aggregate, in a nuanced way via comparative institutional analysis.  
Examining constructed commons in knowledge and information contexts builds on the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework pioneered by Ostrom and her 
colleagues, but it adds some important modifications. The IAD framework has been used 
principally to structure analysis of solutions to collective action problems in natural resource 
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contexts (so-called action arenas, or action situations) such as forests, fisheries, and irrigation 
systems. IAD analysis is premised largely on choice-processing, goal-oriented behavior by self-
interested individuals. It looks to explain sustainable collective action that produces measurable, 
productive results. The insight from applying the IAD framework to a large number of governance 
institutions and resources is that commons solutions can be as stable and robust as market-oriented 
solutions to classic “tragedy of the commons” overconsumption dilemmas involving depletable 
natural resources. Shared governance can lead to sustainable fisheries and forests and to regular 
supplies of usable water.  
The knowledge commons framework differs from the IAD framework in certain key 
respects. It does not assume the agency of rational, choice-selecting, self-interested individuals, as 
the IAD framework tends to do. It accepts the role of historical contingency and of both inward-
and outward-directed (selfless or other-oriented) agents in the evolution of collective or commons 
institutions. At the front end of the analysis, it requires understanding the contingency of the 
underlying resources themselves. Natural resource commons largely take the existence of their 
resources for granted: fish, trees, water, and the like. Knowledge commons identify resource 
design and creation as variables to be described and analyzed. As intellectual resources (that is, as 
forms of knowledge and information), patents, copyrights, and underlying inventions, creations, 
and data are shaped by a variety of institutional forces rather than by nature. Critically, the 
knowledge commons framework does not assume that the relevant resources are rival and 
depletable. The knowledge commons framework generally assumes precisely the contrary: that 
intangible information and knowledge resources are nonrival, nondepletable public goods. The 
dilemma to be solved is not primarily a classic “tragic commons” overconsumption problem. 
Instead, it is more likely (in part) an underproduction problem and (in part) a coordination problem. 
As noted above, this chapter directs primary attention to coordination dilemmas, but in applying 
the framework to any particular case, care must be given to describing the authentic character of 
the social dilemmas present.  
Against that background, the knowledge commons framework proposes to undertake 
comparative institutional analysis by evaluating cases of commons resources via a series of 
questions, or clusters, to be applied in each instance.35 
The case study investigation begins with a general description of the history and character 
of the problem that is being addressed by governance in the specific case or context. This may be 
an explanation that is internal to the governed institution(s) (problems and explanations may 
emerge from stories told by participants, either today or historically, or both), or an explanation 
that is external to the governed institution (such as the public goods account of the rise of IP law). 
One should ask whether the relevant resource or case is characterized from the outset by 
patent rights or other proprietary rights, as in the case of a patent pool, or by a legal regime of 
formal or informal openness, as in the case of public domain data or information collected in a 
government archive. A particular regime might involve sharing data and information, or sharing 
rights in information, or sharing both. The character of the commons solution might involve 
coordinating holders of different IP interests or holders of different public domain knowledge 
resources, for example.  
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Answering that question sets a baseline against which a commons governance regime has 
been constructed. Within that regime, one next asks definitional questions. What are the relevant 
resources, taking into account both intangible and tangible resources and their individual or social 
character? What are the relationships among these resources, the baseline, and any relevant legal 
regime (for example, what a scientist considers to be an invention, what patent law considers to be 
an invention, and the boundaries of the patent itself are three related but distinct things)? What are 
the boundaries and constitution (membership) of the community or communities that manage 
access to and use of those resources? How is membership acquired (this may be informal, formal, 
or a blend of the two), and how is membership governed? What is good behavior within the group, 
what is bad behavior, who polices that boundary, and how?  
Next are questions concerning explicit and implicit goals and objectives of commons 
governance, if any such goals and objectives exist (it is possible that commons governance regimes 
emerge from historical contingency rather than via planning). Is there a particular resource 
development or management dilemma that commons governance is intended to address, and what 
commons strategies are used to address that dilemma?  
How “open” are the knowledge and information resources and the community of 
participants that create, use, and manage them? Governing Knowledge Commons argues that 
commons governance regimes involve significant measures of resource and community sharing 
and openness. Their details should be specified, along with their contributions to the effectiveness 
of commons. Some commons and commons resources have precise and fixed definitions of both 
resources and community membership. Either resources or membership or both may be more fluid, 
with boundaries defined by flexible standards rather than by rules.  
A large and critical cluster of questions concerns the dynamics of commons governance, 
or what Ostrom refers to as the “rules-in-use” of commons: the interactions of commons 
participants and resources. Included in this cluster of questions are: (1) details of stories of the 
origins, histories, and operations of commons; (2) formal and informal (norm-based) rules and 
practices regarding distribution and coordination of commons resources among participants, 
including rules for appropriation and replenishment of commons resources; (3) the institutional 
setting(s), including the character of the regime’s possibly being “nested” in larger scale 
institutions and being dependent on other, adjacent institutions; (4) relevant legal regimes, 
including but not limited to IP law; (5) the structure of interactions between commons resources 
and participants and institutions adjacent to and outside the regime; and (6) dispute resolution and 
other disciplinary mechanisms by which commons rules, norms, and participants are policed.  
At this point it becomes possible to identify and assess outcomes. In Ostrom’s IAD 
framework, outcomes are typically assessed in terms of the resources themselves. Has a fishery 
been managed in a way that sustains fish stocks over time? Do commons participants, such as the 
members of a fishing community, earn returns in the commons context that match or exceed returns 
from participation in an alternative governance context? In knowledge commons, resource-based 
outcome measures may be difficult to identify and assess. Sustaining the resources and their uses, 
individually or in combination, may be the point. In a patent pool, pooled resources may constitute 
components of larger, complex products that could not be produced but for the pooling 
arrangement that reduces transactions costs among participants. Outcomes take different forms. It 
may be the case that patterns of participant interaction constitute relevant outcomes as well as 
relevant inputs. Agency, in a manner of speaking, may be less important than identity; the group 
and its participants, in a particular institutional setting, may be ends as well as means. Levels and 
types of interaction and combination matter. Participant interaction in the context of a shared 
resource pool or group may give rise to (or preserve, or modify) an industrial field or a technical 
discipline. In that specific case, such spillovers may be treated as relevant outcomes.  
Having identified relevant outcomes, it becomes possible to look back at the problems that 
defined commons governance in the first place. Has the regime solved those problems, and if not, 
then what gaps remain? How do the outcomes produced by commons governance differ from 
outcomes that might have been available if alternative governance had been employed? Has 
commons governance created costs or risks that should give policy makers and/or institution 
designers pause? Costs of administration might be needlessly high; costs of participation might be 
high. A collection of industrial firms that pool related patents in order to produce complex products 
may engage in anticompetitive, collusive behavior. Commons governance may facilitate 
innovation; it may also facilitate stagnation. 
5. THE KNOWLEDGE COMMONS RESEARCH FRAMEWORK APPLIED 
The social worlds of knowledge and innovation are filled with cases of commons, in which users 
(or consumers, or participants, or others) are responding to social dilemmas and generating or 
making sets of governance rules and standards for themselves.This chapter lacks the space to fully 
apply and specify the framework with respect even to one rich case study; instead, it suggests how 
the knowledge commons framework may inform further research, particularly with respect to the 
related ideas of user-innovation and law as a shared commons resource. 
 
5.1 Galaxy Zoo36 
Example one is a case in which commons governance emerged to coordinate an astonishingly and 
apparently unmanageably large information resource.  
Galaxy Zoo supplies a wildly successful model of what popular media refer to at times as 
“citizen science” and at other times and in other respects as peer production or “crowdsourcing.” 
Academic researchers in astronomy in 2007 created a website that invited any and all comers to 
undertake the task of classifying approximately 900,000 galaxies, by looking at images 
downloaded from a recent sky survey. The classification exercise involved only a handful of 
relatively simple criteria and could be undertaken by non-experts after a brief online tutorial. The 
sponsoring researchers expected to rely on the results as part of preparing traditional scientific 
papers. (In the main, that has been the case, with some exceptions.) The researchers’ initial modest 
expectations regarding the number of visitors to the site and the quality of their contributions were 
rapidly and vastly exceeded. The project was quickly extended both in depth and in breadth. The 
socio-technical “zoo” architecture that evolved in conjunction with the original Galaxy Zoo project 
has been refined and applied to additional and similarly-structured scientific research projects, all 
of them collected since December 2009 under the umbrella name, the “Zooniverse.”  
Galaxy Zoo began as a single solution to a pair of research problems. One of these was the 
domain of Kevin Schawinski, who in the mid-2000s was a graduate student in astronomy at the 
University of Oxford. Schawinski was researching the evolution of elliptical galaxies, that is, he 
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was pursuing morphological analysis of galaxies, distinguishing elliptical from spiral-shaped 
galaxies. Galaxy morphology is closely linked to color. Most spiral galaxies have a distinct blue 
tinge, which is associated with the younger, hotter stars in their spiral arms. Elliptical galaxies 
usually appear red, indicating the older ages of their stars and low levels of star formation. Blue 
ellipticals suggest the existence of gas reservoirs sufficient to support significant levels of star 
formation and are therefore of special interest to researchers. Schawinski aimed to examine a 
massive amount of digital astronomical data recently made available by the Sloan Digital Sky 
Survey (SDSS), a project of an international consortium of seven universities, other participating 
research institutions, several governments, and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. The SDSS had 
undertaken the largest comprehensive electronic map of the northern sky produced to date. Using 
a special purpose telescope on Apache Point, New Mexico, beginning in 2000 it imaged 10,000 
square degrees of the sky, 70 million stars, and 50 million galaxies, resulting in approximately 15 
trillion bytes of data, all of which were made publicly available as images to the research 
community. Schawinski planned to review and classify approximately 900,000 galaxies disclosed 
in the SDSS data. He tried, briefly, to do this himself, but he abandoned the effort because it was 
simply too time-consuming.  
The second problem was the domain of another Oxford researcher, a post-doctoral fellow 
named Chris Lintott. Lintott was trying to understand spiral galaxies, also within the SDSS dataset. 
Whereas Schawinski was after blue ellipticals, Lintott was after red (that is, mostly dead) spirals. 
(In each instance, the existence of these galaxies would suggest new research problems having to 
do with galaxy evolution and the birth and death of stars.) Schawinski’s conversations with Lintott 
yielded the idea that the classification exercise that interested each of them could be out-sourced, 
in a manner of speaking, to the public. Borrowing insights and some elementary technology from 
other, recent online scientific “crowdsourcing” efforts, notably Stardust@Home, the first, public, 
Galaxy Zoo website (http://www.galaxyzoo.org) made the SDSS image data available online 
beginning in July 2007. The images were accompanied by a brief tutorial describing the 
classification dimensions that visitors were invited to learn and apply. (The phrase “Galaxy Zoo” 
evokes the idea of a zoo of galaxies – a somewhat unruly collection of “animals” with distinct 
appearances.) A handful of simple questions were asked, directed to morphological issues. Based 
on a brief online tutorial, users were asked: Is this an elliptical galaxy or a spiral galaxy, or 
something else? If it is a spiral galaxy, which way does it appear to be rotating? Related publicity 
(principally through the BBC) described the launch of the project and pointed visitors to the 
website. 
The project was a tremendous success almost overnight, in several senses related to 
knowledge commons governance and the challenges of solving coordination problems. First, the 
data classification problem that Galaxy Zoo was intended to solve was solved far more quickly 
and thoroughly than the organizers anticipated. Within 24 hours of launch, the site was receiving 
70,000 classifications per hour. More than 50 million classifications were received by the project 
during its first year, from almost 150,000 people. Galaxy Zoo is now the world’s largest database 
of galaxy shapes. The organizers, principally Lintott and Schawinski, built a technical platform 
that successfully coordinated the individual (and typically quite small) analytic contributions of 
thousands of non-expert contributors. 
Second, the model of citizen science data analysis that Galaxy Zoo introduced appears to 
be socially productive at least in the sense that it has been accepted by the community of 
professional astronomers. The original Galaxy Zoo project has been succeeded by follow-on 
astronomical research projects using closely related protocols: Galaxy Zoo 2, which asked 
participants to classify more finely a subset of 250,000 galaxies from the original SDSS Main 
Galaxy Sample, using a different and more detailed set of questions; Galaxy Zoo: Hubble, which 
asked participants to classify a different group of older and more distant galaxies using data derived 
from images obtained through the Hubble Space Telescope; and now Galaxy Zoo Quench, which 
offered volunteers the opportunity to both classify and analyze galaxy data. In the case of the 
original Galaxy Zoo, Galaxy Zoo 2, and Galaxy Zoo: Hubble, the zoo-produced data either has 
been incorporated into a continuing series of scientific research papers published in scholarly 
journals or is being prepared for publication. (Galaxy Zoo Quench is still in progress.) More than 
30 peer reviewed papers have followed from analysis of the original Galaxy Zoo data.  
Third, the large scale data analysis and coordination exercise prompted by the original 
Galaxy Zoo has had unanticipated spillover benefits. Not only have the analytic contributions of 
Galaxy Zoo volunteers been coordinated successfully, but the thousands of volunteers have 
coordinated each other by organizing themselves into a self-governed online forum, creating and 
sustaining a community that is adjacent to, and in some respects overlaps with, the community of 
professional astronomers. Through their forum, member “Zooites,” that is, amateur Galaxy Zoo 
participants, have made a number of important discoveries based on the original SDSS data shared 
via Galaxy Zoo. Those discoveries have themselves been the bases for a number of scholarly 
papers. All of these Galaxy Zoo projects are now part of the larger cluster of citizen science 
projects known as the Zooniverse. Nearly 200,000 people are registered users of one or more 
Zooniverse projects, and more than 800,000 have participated in one way or another. This 
represents knowledge coordination and knowledge commons governance on an extraordinarily 
large scale. 
5.2 Best Practices Projects 
Example two is more law-specific on its surface and more subtle in its illustration of shared 
governance as a solution to a social dilemma. The Galaxy Zoo commons exists as a self-governed 
community with virtually no explicit reference to IP law or other positive law. Commons 
governance may arise more clearly in the shadow of formal, positive law. Research on informal 
social norms and customary practices in a diverse range of creative communities illustrates in part. 
French chefs, magicians, fashion designers, tattoo artists, stand-up comedians, graffiti artists, and 
even online pornographers have originated sets of social norms to govern their respective 
communities specifically in the absence of, and sometimes in opposition to, relevant IP law.37 
 
In these cases of “substitute IP,” there is a complex relationship between governance norms 
that guide production, appropriation, and re-combination of the relevant creative things, on the one 
hand, and group identity and membership, on the other. In some respects, commons governance 
serves as a guide to solving social dilemmas with respect to the objects of the group (producing 
and sharing magic tricks for magicians, or jokes for stand-up comedians) but also as a framework 
for constituting the group itself. Often, production of the intellectual resource (the recipe for the 
French chef) is not the subject of a social dilemma. The dilemma lies in coordinating distribution 
of and access to the resource among members of the group. The group or community is both the 
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source and the product of norm-based governance as an emergent or “user-generated” 
phenomenon. It is not merely the case that magicians follow a sort of private, customary, and 
informal code with respect to the secrecy of their tricks. It is also the case that the identity of a 
magician is defined in part by participation in that code.38 
 
In a related but distinct class of cases, the relationship between governance and group 
appears to be more direct. In these cases it appears more clearly that governance itself is the shared 
commons resource, rather than creative works or ideas or other forms of knowledge. Members of 
these groups are coordinating their respective responses to possible threats that they will suffer 
claims of IP rights infringement by third party rights holders and developing a shared governance 
norm as a result. 
 
Since 2005 scholars at American University's Washington College of Law and Center for 
Media and Social Impact (formerly the Center for Social Media) have produced and published a 
series of Statements of Best Practices in Fair Use for a variety of creative communities. The 
purpose of each of these Statements is to identify and document a set of expectations and practices 
within specific communities that would guide their creative practice in avoiding unnecessary 
entanglement with potential liability for copyright infringement. In the context of US copyright 
law, the purpose is to provide a “soft” guide to fair use. The Statements are not negotiated with 
rights holders, and it is not intended that compliance with the guidelines in the Statements should 
be binding, as contractual obligations would be, should formal copyright disputes ever arise. The 
guides are predictions, grounded in relevant precedent, that, should a dispute later arise, conduct 
in conformity with the relevant Statement would also turn out to be persuasive to a judge. Creators 
are given some significant confidence before the fact that their creative practices are lawful, 
without clearing those practices with rights holders. There is hope but no promise that a future 
court would excuse accused infringement if the defendant alleged good faith compliance with one 
of these Statements. 
 
The production of each of these Statements, intended as guides for non-lawyers, follows a 
similar path: partnership with entities and organizations that represent members of the relevant 
community; a lengthy series of interviews and meetings with members of the community to 
determine the community's own understanding of its interests and practices relative to the uses of 
copyrighted works; and preparation of documents and related materials that fix that understanding 
in writing, with appropriate illustrations and guidelines, in the context of background copyright 
doctrine. The results are then published back to the community and otherwise distributed publicly. 
To date, the objects and subjects of these Best Practices Statements have included documentary 
filmmakers, producers of online video, media literacy educators, communication scholars, 
producers of open courseware, poets, dance archivists, research librarians, journalists, and 
librarians and archivists working with orphan works. This is an eclectic group of interests, and 
each project is time-consuming and labor-intensive.39 
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These Statements both comprise and reflect user-generated shared governance of a distinct 
sort. The members of a given community of practice are sharing their respective experiences with 
one another, not in order to produce new or more complex creative products but instead in order 
to construct a form of collective discipline that is possible only by virtue of that sharing. The shared 
social resource is governance relative to IP practice; the IP resources themselves are not necessarily 
social or shared. The Statements are also collective advocacy of a very concrete if unorthodox 
character. They seek not only to document existing practices within the group, but to create an 
aspiration, an ideal to which the members of the group might conform. In that sense, the Statements 
are commons-based law reform, or a kind of law themselves: rules and standards that not only 
emanate from and govern the group, but also rules and standards by which the group is willing to 
be judged by external authorities, in alignment with but distinct from the standards otherwise given 
by positive IP law. Those other authorities might include courts, as noted above, who might look 
to compliance with a Statement of Best Practices in determining whether or not an act of accused 
infringement should be excused as fair use. Those other authorities might include other 
institutional gatekeepers, such as internet service providers or liability insurance carriers, which 
might rely on compliance with a Statement of Best Practices by a client, customer, or partner as 
evidence that doing business with that party would not pose an unnecessary risk.  
 
 Although some anecdotal evidence suggests that this shared governance has been 
successful, in the sense that relevant creative communities have benefited in terms of being able 
to produce additional creative work,40 the Statements of Best Practices have not been free from 
debate. The claim that creative groups are normative, law-giving groups is strengthened by 
evidence that creative communities are themselves normative in terms of being the loci of creative 
production.41 It is also strengthened, curiously, by published skepticism of the Best Practices 
Statements.42 Relevant content owners have been skeptical of the Statements on the ground that 
they are unilateral, rather than understandings negotiated bilaterally with copyright owners. Some 
scholars have expressed concern that the Statements tend to lock in backward-looking, customary 
practices43 and crowd out the radical creator who is untethered to community norms. In both 
instances, critics would prefer that the Statements adopt a specifically descriptive perspective and 
avoid any connotation of normativity. In both instances, critics appear to prefer that governance 
be documented via bilateral and/or individual determination and adjudication with respect to 
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individual intellectual resources, rather than collectively with respect to social intellectual 
resources. Critics resist the idea that the Statements carry the force of a kind of user-created law; 
the resistance itself highlights the governance power that the Statements exert. There is, to be sure, 
a kind of strength in numbers. 
 
  The purpose of this brief review of the Best Practices Statements is not to resolve the 
normative question but to point out in a preliminary way how these forms of governance may be 
analyzed using the knowledge commons framework, borrowing insights from the user-innovation 
literature and focusing specifically on law as a shared – and abundant – information resource. 
Further and more detailed exploration of this and other cases should, in time, produce better and 
generalizable knowledge about commons governance. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
This chapter has highlighted the distinction between information abundance and information 
scarcity when considering the law and public policy governing intellectual resources, and it has 
argued that investigation of the information and knowledge landscape has been overly concerned 
with the latter, at the expense of the former. The result has been overemphasis of the tragedy of 
the commons story as a metaphor for social dilemmas regarding information and knowledge, an 
overemphasis on solving alleged problems of information and knowledge production and 
distribution, and an over-reliance on systems of IP rights as solutions to social dilemmas involving 
intellectual resources. Highlighting information and abundance, by contrast, leads to increasing 
attention to questions of coordination and combination with respect to the use and re-use of 
intellectual resources. Stories other than the tragedy of the commons may come to prominence; 
strategies of sharing rather than exclusion may take a prominent place in the policy makers’ 
cupboard of institutional solutions. But the ultimate question is empirical rather than theoretical. 
How should social worlds make sense of the availability of lots of information, rather than too 
little? 
Answering that question leads to the suggestion that the knowledge commons framework 
offers an important and useful research tool for investigating the institutional dynamics of specific 
contexts for sharing knowledge resources. In some cases, formal IP systems are appropriate and 
important pieces of the governance of knowledge and information. In other cases, formal IP 
systems are effectively irrelevant. In many cases, the question for research is the respective roles 
of IP and other governance mechanisms. Research from the field of user-innovation studies, and 
attention to the shared character of law itself as a knowledge resource, suggest productive ways in 
which coordination dilemmas can be highlighted and solved using knowledge commons strategies. 
Applying the knowledge commons framework to a robust set of case studies will, in time, yield 
better information  
Knowledge commons, or structured information sharing, does not operate on a simple 
uniform or standard principle. Research to date confirms as much.44 And knowledge commons 
strategies are no more a panacea for social dilemmas concerning information and knowledge 
resources than are formal IP systems themselves. Applying the knowledge commons framework 
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to a robust set of case studies will, in time, yield better guidance for designing and deploying 
effective commons governance in knowledge and innovation settings. 
 
